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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah·
ANEST AGGELOS,

YS.
ZELLA

MINING ;CoMPANY,

a

·COr-

poration of Utah, et al.,
De fendaJn.ts,
Including Stephen J. Hays, Julia
Rays H·oge, Mrs. Lou ·Gorey,
. Mrs. Ethel V. Reilley, Mary
Louise 0 'Donnell, Lucille Y.
Hays, as Administratrix of the
Estate of Lawrence J. Hays,
deeeased, and S. Hays ·Company, a cJrporation,

No. 6217

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
The brief of appellant is a.bout as miscellaneous and
un-understandahle ~so far as presenting the facts and i~s
sues in this case is concerned .as the a_bstract which was
prepared. In the hope tha.t we ~ay assist the c-ourt in
understanding what this case is all wborut, we shall restate the facts as disclosed by the evidence.
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ST,ATE~IE·NT

OF F'ACT·S.

Mineral Entry No. 21~4 designated by the surveyor
general as ·Lot No. 118, known throughout these prnceedings as Clays Placer Mining ·Claim, is owned by defendants Zelia Mining Company, a corporation, (3/4ths) and
S. Hays ·Company (1/4th). :Lt is located in the West
Mountain Mining District Salt Lake County, Utah, otherwise known as Bingham Canyon, below town. The
abstract, Exhibit 2, \vas i·ntrodueed in evidence.
Defendants introduced in evidence tax receipts showing payments of taxes by tthem and their predeees·sors in
interest from the year 1917 to and including the year 1938
(see Exhibits 1 and 6.) ' The assessments were m.ade
under the heading ''Real Es ta:te'' and '' P·a tented Mining
C'laims ", and covered a one-fourth interest and threefourths interest respectively in "'Clays Placer (11'8) ",
and also described under another heading as ''Bingham
Placers''.
It was stipulated (Tr. 103-104) that the assessments
of this -claim were as paid by defendants made by the
State ·Tax C:ommission after its .organization in 19'31.
Plaintiff Aggelos has been living on a portion of the
property for a number of years. There are two small
houses on it, one of which, a four room frame house, was
built in 1927 hy plaintiff, and at the same time he built a
garage. There was a fence on three sides of an area surrounding these houses, but the fences were torn down by
plaintiff about two years before the action was br,ought
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(Ab. 27), at w·hich time the ground was filled in with
dirt to the depth of about six feet.
The county assess-or of Salt Lake ·C.ounty for a nunlber of years prior to and including the year 1927 made
purported as-sessmentg in :the name of plaintiff under the
heading ''real estate'' in the following language : '' Improvements on Clays Placer'', which were paid by plaintiff. In 1928 there was a purported assessment by the
county assessor in the name of plaintiff in the following
language: ''Improvements on Clays Placer, Copperton,
Bingham Canyon, below town.'' ( Tr. 142, 143) This
amount was paid by plaintiff Novemher 29, 1928.
In 1929 the assessor -of Salt Lake County made a
pur.p·orted assessment in the name of plaintiff under th·e
heading, "Improvements on ~Clays Placer, ~Copperton,
;Bingham Canyon, below town''. This was eha·nged in red
ink to read, ''Real E~sta.te and Improvements''. This
was nort paid. ( Tr. 142, 143)
In 1930 is a purported assessment by the county assess-or of .Salt Lake County in the name of plai·ntiff under
the heading, ''Improvements on Clays Pla~cer, Copperton,
Bingham ·Canyon, below town'', then a change in red ink
by writing above that description, "R. E. and''. This
was not paid. (Tr. 143, 144)
In 1931 the as.sessor of Salrt Lake County made a purportea assessment in the name. of plaintiff under the
heading ''Real E-state and i..mprovements on Clays
Pla!cer, Co.p·perton, Bin~ham Canyon, fbelow town.'' ( Tr.
145, 146) ·This was not paid.
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In 1932 ('Tr. 146, 147) the County A:sjs-essor of Salt
L~ake Q.ounty made a purported asses.sment, '·'·Real Etatte
and Improvements on Clays Plaicer, Copperton, Bingham
:Canyon, below town'', in the name of plaintiff. This was
not pafd.
In 1933 the county assessor of Salt Lake County
made a purported assessment in the name of plaintiff
under the des-cription '·'Real Estate and Improvements
on Clays P.la.cer, c·opperton, Bingham ·Canyon, below
tow·n''. This was not paid.
:rn 19'34 the county assessor of S-alt Lake County
made a purported ass-essment in the name of plaintiff
under the des-cription ''Real 'Eistate and Improvement·s
;on ·C'lay:s Pla:cer, Copperton, Bingham Ca:nyon, below
town". Paid De·cember 20, 1934, (Tr. 147)
In 1935 1the c-ounty assessor of Salt Lake County
made a purported assessment under the descripti.on,
''Real Estate and Improvements on ~clays PlaJcer, Copperton, Bi·ngham Canyon, below town''. Paid January
7,. 19·36. ('Tr. 148)
In 19;3·6 the county assess-or of Salt Lake C'ounty
made a purported ass-essment in the name of plaintiff
under the description ''Real ESttate and Improvements
on ·C1ays Placer, Cop.perton, Bingha~ Canyon, below
town''. P:aid December 21, 1'9a6. (Tr. 149)
In 1g.37 the ·county assessor of Salt

L~ake

County

made a purported assessment in the name of plaintiff
under the description ''Real Estate and Improvements
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on ·Clays Placer, C·opperton, Bing·ham ·Canyon, below
town''. Paid December 20, 1g.37.
~On

May 26, 19·36 plaintiff paid to the Treasurer of
Salt Lake Colmty the sum of $143.2-5 and re-eeived a.
receipt '' suhject to approval of ·C.ounty ·C'ommissioners
to be acc.epted for quit-claim deed to the following property: '' R.. E. and Impr. on Clays Placer, Cop.p·erton,
Bingham ·Canyon, below tow·n' ', representing purp·orted
delinquent taxes for t1:he years 19·29, 1930, 19'31, 1'9·32 and
19~33. Thereafter on the first day of June, 19-36 there
was .a deed, E'xhibit ''A'', from Salt Lake County to
plaintiff, ·purporting to convey to the plaintiff all of the
title of the state, eounty, and of eaeh eity, town, Stchool
and other taxing districts in the "following described tract
of land in Salt Lake County, ~State of Utah: ''R. E·. and
Imps. on Clays Placer, ·C'opperton, Bingham Canyon,
below town ''.
It was testified by the deputy county treasurer that
the initials "R. E.'' means real e~tate (Tr. 151) and
''Imp." means improvements. The description of the
property taxed '' R. E. and Imp. on ·Clays Placer'', et·c.,
appears under the general heading "Real Estate'' in the
assessor's re·cord. (Tr. 150)
1

D·eputy

~County

Assessor Matilda

Gerrar~d

testified

·(Tr. 161) that this was a general assessment made under
the design·ation "Real Estate".
Plaintiff testified that in 1919 he paid James Kora.bes
and William Pappas $1500.00, at which time no paper was
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made out. No evidence was given as to the conversations
~that were had ·Or the legal effect of that tra:nsaction. The
c.ourt sustained objections to the attempted testimony of
legal eonclusions.
Plaintiff brought suit on July 20, 1937 to quiet title
to a portion of the surface of the Clays Placer Mining
Claim, Lot 118, as described in paragraph IX of the
complaint, and alleged ownership and possession in himself for more than seven years prior to commencement
of the action, that the premises were enclosed on three
sides by a good substantial fence, and that for more
than seventeen years he had paid all the taxes lawfully
levied upon the premises.
These allegations were denied by defendants, and
as .an affirmative defense ·defendants alleged that they
and their prede,c:essora in interest had paid all taxes upon
the property for upwards of twenty years.
The court found that defendants were the owners of
the mining elaim and the who~le of it; that plaintiff for
approximately sev~nteen years has been in possession
and ·Oecupancy of a portion of the mining ·claim and has
made ·certain improvements thereon, but that such oceupancy and possession was without title or claim .of
title; that plaintiff never at any time or at all, and particularly during the s·even years prior to the commencement of the action, paid any taxes lawfully levied a11d assessed upon
. the premises ; thwt for many years prior to
the ·commencement of the action, and particularly during
the seven years immediately prior thereto, defendants
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paid taxes levied and assessed on the premises by the
State Board of Equalization, \Y hich taxes "rere levied,
assessed and covered ~the lands and premises in question,
and the \vhole thereof. The court further found tha.t the
possession and ·oe.cupancy by plaintiff wa.s in subordination to the leg-al title of defendants.
From these findings of fact the trial eourt concluded
tthat plaintiff hiad ·not held ·Or possessed the premises adversely to the leg·ai title and was not entitled to a. decree
quieting title, and thereup.on ordered the a.ction dismissed
"\Yith prejudice.
Plaintiff assigns as error the making of these findings of fact, conclusio-ns of law and de,cree.

Att the outset it is \veil to hear in mind a few fundamental .propositions to which we will direct the court's
attention before considering the sufficien·cy of the evidence.

I.
Persons claiming by adverse use have the burden of
proving each and every element. necessary to state their
elaim, and all doubts are resolved against su.ch adverse
claimants.
1 American Jurisprudence 926, Section 237, ''Adverse P·ossession'' :
'·'In accordance with the familiar rule that the
burd·en of proof rests on him who has the affirma-
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tive of an issue, the party relying on a title by
adverse possession has the- burden of proving all
the fa.cts necessary to e.stablis:h su-ch a. title.''

Sprimg Creek Irriga.tion Comparny v. z.oUinger, 58
Utah 90. ·8ee numerous ·Cases ·cited under Section 104-27, Revised :Statutes of Utah.

'' (S·ec. '585) A. Burden ·Of Proof-1. As to
Adverse Possession. The burden of proving adverse possession is in all cases upon him who sets
it up and relies ·On it. 'All presumptions are in
favor of the legal holder, aTid the burden of over.eoming them rests wirth him who assails the legal
title'. The claimant must show every element necessary to ·c.onstitute a title under the statute of
limitations, and if he fails 1to do so it is the duty
·Of the ·court to instruct the jury that there is not
sufficient evidence to ·entitle him to reeover. Thus
.he must show tha!t the pos.session was actual, open
and notorious, continuous, for the full time required by the statute, ·exclusive, hostile and under
a ·Claim of right. S·o, if payment of taxes is made
an element of title by adverse possession by statU!te, the burden of proof is upon the party s·etting
up adverse possession to show such payment, and
thus bring himself within the terms of the act.
The ,claimant hy adverse posse.ssion als·o has the
burden of showing the ·extent of his possession,
and he must show an advers·e occupancy of a definite area sufficiently described on Wihi·ch to found
a verdict. ''
In adverse ti1tle suits poss·ession is presumed to he
in the person having legal title, and the occupation of the
property .by others is deem~d to be under and in subordi-
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nation to. the legal title, unless it a.ppear,s that the property has been held and adversely possessed for seven
years before the commencement of the action. Revised
Statutes of Utah, 104-2-7.
It is uncontradicted in this case that plaintiff is not
relying upon a. "\Yritten instrument as the basis for any
adverse pos,session.

Under the pr:ovisions of

,Se~ction

104-2-10 of our Revised Statutes any such action must be
under claim of title. Many States do not require adverse
possession to be couple-d with elaim of title. :Such is not
the case in the State of Utah. While under .our statute
a writing is not ne.c.essary to estaiblish the claim of title,
irt is nevertheless nec.essary that posession be taken under
claim of title. There is no evidence in this case of any
such purported claim of title.
In addition it is necessary that the property must
have been protected by a substantial e-nclosure. R.evised
Statutes .of Utah 104-2-11.
Also :such adverse -claimant must establish that he
and his predecessors in interest and grantors have paid
all taxes which have been levied and assessed up·on such

land acco:vding to law.

Revised Statutes of Utah, 104-

2-12.
We .shall first discuss and consider whether plaintiff
established by any evidence that he ha.d paid all taxes
lawfully assessed.
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(Assignments of Error 2 and 3.)
Appellant states under these assignments that the
unc.ontradicted evidence shows plaintiff to have paid all
taxes lawfully assessed, and that the finding of fact that
defendants had paid all taxes lawfully assessed was in
error.
The facts upon whieh these alleged errors exist have
been heretofore :set forth.
Under, the provisions of the ·Constitution of U~tah,
Article XIII, Section 4 and Section 11, and under the
,provisions of Se-ctions 80-5-3, 80-5-55, and 80-5-56, an
mines and mining claims are 1to be assessed by the State
·Tax ~Commission, both as to surface and suh-surface
rights. All other property is, under the pliovisions of
Sectiion 80-5-3, assessed by the eounty assessors. In the
presenee of that ~c'Onstitutional provision and those provisions ·of our sta1tute, it is difficult to see how plaintiff
·can suecessfully claim that the purported taxes paid by
him were lawfully assessed, .si~nce it is undisputed in the
evidence that the property involved is mining pr-operty
and should be assessed by the State Tax Commission.
Any assessment .of mining property ihy the county
assessor as to ·either surfa-ce or suJb.-surfa,ce rights is an
illegal assessment and does not constitute the payment
all of taxes which shall have been levied and assessed

·according to law as required by our statute.
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This court ha.s held tha.t a.n adverse title cannot he
based and founded upon the payment of any -such illegally assessed taxes.
In the .case of Ri.o Gra;nd-e Western, Railroad c·ompany v. Salt Lake I'nvestment Company, 3'5 Utah 528, the
railroad .eompany \Yas attempting to sustain adve;rse
possession 11pon .the basis of taxes levied by the S;tate
Board of Equalization upon a lot adj.oini·ng, but not a
part of, its railroad right of way. At that time the State
Board of E:qua.lization assessed railroad property and
the railroad company induced ·the ·State B·oard of
Equalization to include the lot in question in its right
of way assessment. On the other ha·nd the owners of the
lot had paid taxes upon it as asses·sed by the oonnty
assessor. The si tua.tion was exactly the reverse of that
involved in the .case. at bar. This c:ourt held th,at since
the State ·B·oard of Equa.lization had no power to assess
the lot that the railroad company ·could not rely up·on
the payment of any such taxes as a basis for adverse
po.s.session and disallo" cd their rights, using the following language :
7

''Under the undisputed evidence, either ;tihe State
Board of Equalization had jurisdiction to make
the assessment for taxation of the property in
question, or the .county assessor had it. The right
to assess the .same property could not exist in
both at the same time. We think the power to
assess lot 8 was vested in the county assessor, and
that the State B·oard of Equalization had no jurisdic1tion over any part of lot 8 e~cept the strip
taken and oc.cupied by the railroad company as a
right of way. If the railroad company desires
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to -claim title by adverse posses·sion to prop~erty
other than .such as has been used and ·occupied di~s
tinctively for railroad purposes, it must prove
that itt has paid all the taxes that were assessed
by the local authorities, or show that such assessment was made without authority, or that the
taxes levied against tthe property were void for
s-ome other reason. We think no one would seri·ously contend that an individual might take
possession of any portion of the right of way or
depot grounds or other real property used by a
railr:oad company for railroad purposes, and, by
giving sueh portion a .particular des~crip,tion for
the purposes of taxation, he .could thereby withdraw the property from the jurisdi,ction of the
State Board ·Of E:qualization and place it within
the power of the loeal assessor, and when he had
done so suceeed in his ~claim that :he, the claimant,
and not the railroad· -company, had paid the taxes
.a.n-d hence had acquired title 1by adverse possession. Yet, if what the appellant claims in this
ca.se ·can be sustained, then we can see no good
reason why an individual may no,t, by his own
act, determine what is and what is not railroad
property for the .Purpo:s-es of assessment and
taxation. Would not the question, namely, if the
railroad company may do this, why cannot an
individual do s-o, have to be a'nswered either in the
negative or the affirmative in favor. or against
either claimant~ We are of the .opinion, therefore, that appellant has not brought its -claim of
adverse posses~ion within the purview of s-ec,tion
2866, .supra, and hence this claim must fail.''
See als·o Gr:arys Harbor Commercial Compa;ny v.
McCullooh, (Wash.) 1'93 Pac. 709.
The power to tax mining property is vested entirely
in the Stat:e T.ax Commission by ~he -constitution and the
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statutes; and no county officer has any right to add to
or change the assessment by the State Tax Commission,
and any attempted asses~ment of .all or any portion of
the Clays Placer Clairn by the c·ounty Assessor was a
mere nullity.

In tw·o Federal eases, Sa.Zt Lake Coun~ty v. Utaih
Oopper Comp·am.y, 294 Fed. 199, and Be:a,ver Cownty v.
South Utah J.llines cf: Sm.elters, 17 F:ed. (2d) 577, it was
iheld that attempts -of Salt Lake ,c:ounty and Bea:ver
County, respectively, to tax tailings and tailings dumps
through assessment hy ~the county assessor were invalid
and a nullity. In the Beaver County case the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit

sai~d

this· was true

even though the mine itself had been worked out. We'
quote the following from !the Salt Lake ·County case:
''These tailings are a pr·oduct of the plaintiff's mine. The limitation of .the power of the
Legislature by se.ction 4 of article 13 of the Constitution prevented the existence of a.ny authority or power in the taxing officers of the -county
to assess them or to levy taxes upon them for the
years 19jl7 and 1918. ' '
Plaintiff proceeds upon the erroneous assumption
t:P.at the county assessor has the power to tax surface
rights -of mining :claims.

Thi~s

contention flies right in

the teeth .of ,the provisions .of Sections 80-'5-3 .and

80-5-5~6

of our Revised Statutes .and the Rio Grande Railway
cases .and the two Federal de·cisions hereinbefore referred to.
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This p·roposi tion aJ one is sufficient to effe.ctually
disp~ose of this ease, because if plaintiff has paid no taxes
assessed aeeording to law he is not ·en1titled to recover.
'There are other reasons, ,however, why he could not
re·eover upon the basis of his alleged tax payments, if
we were t-o assume that the .county assess:o:r had the
power to make the assessments.
In the first place the purpor~ted payment! of taxes by
plain tiff is not tied to the tract of land to which plaintiff
is attempting to quiet title. Ilt will be observed tha.t to
and including the year 19,27 the purported assessment
niade !by the county assessor in the name of plaintiff
deseribed the property as '''Improvements on Clays
Placer.'' In 1928 this wa.s -changed to ''Improvements
on Clays Placer, ·C~opperton, Bingham Canyon below
town". In 1928 the description was similar to 1929, but
someone changed the wording in red ink to insert ''Real
Estate and Improvements" in the place of just the word
"Improvements". The same thing occurred in 1930.
From 19·31 on the property was described as ''Real
Estate and

Impr~ovements

on- Clay Placer, Copperton,

Bingham Canyon below town''.
Any sueh purported

g~eneral

assessment without

s.peei:fically describing the particular portion of the
Clays Placer to be· ·charged with the tax would not he
sufficient to -constitute a lawful assessment against the
surface only of a particular and limited por1tion of the
Clays Pla·cer.
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J'loon v. Salt La.ke (!o'lJ!Yt,ty, 27 Utah 435. This was
an action to quiet title. Salt Lake County was claiming
under tax title, the assessments 'Yhich resulted in the
sales ·being·levioo upon the follo,vin·g described property:
'' 'Pt. N. E. Quarter of s.ec. 26, Township 1,
North, Range 1 ,,. . est Salt Lake Meridian,' .and,
'In N. \\T. quarter iof •N. E. Quarter of Se.c. 26,
To,vnship· 1 North, Range 1 West, :Salt L,aike
Meridian. No. of acres, 7, more or less.' ''
In reYersing the decree in favor of defendant S·alt
Lake ~County this c-ourt said:
'' Ilt will b8 0 bserved that under these descriptions the land in question might have been
located in any part of the larger tract mentioned.
Its location was left wholly uncertain and indeSuch descriptions are calculated to
finite.
mislead the owner of the premises; and do not
comply with the requirements of the law. At the
time the assessments in eontroversy were made,
it was incurn!bent upon the assessing officer to
des·cribe real property with reasonable certainty,
as ;to locality and quantity. 1 C:omp. Laws Utah
1888, section 2013. A proper des.eription of the
real estate to be taxed, in the assessment and
notice of sale, was a. prerequisite to a valid sale.
Where, the.refore, as in this instance, the assessor
failed to des·eribe the land as required by law, all
the subsequent proceedings under the assessment
were null and void. It f1ollows that the defendant
county acquired no title to the land by virtue of
the tax sale. * * * In Olsen v. Bagley, 10
Utah 49i2, 49'5, 37 Pac. 739, 740, it was said: 'Tax
sales are m.ade exclusively under statutory power,
and, unless all the neeessary prerequisites .of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
statute are ea.rried out, the tax sale be-comes
invalid. If one of the prerequisites fail, it is as
fatal as if all failed. The power vested in a
:public officer to sell land ±io~r the nonpayment of
taxes is a. naked power, not coupled with an
interest, and every prerequisite to the exer.cise of
the power must pre-cede its exercise. The title to
be aequired under statutes .authorizing the sale of
land for the nonpayment of taxes is regarded as
stricti juris, and whoever sets up a tax title must
show that .all the requirements of the law have
been -complied with.' ''
This court in the case of Tintic Undine Mining Com-pany v. Ercafnbrack, 93 Utah ·561, invalidated the tax
proceedings where the des~cription of the property sought
to be 'taxed was partially incomplete and uncertain as
in the .case at bar. Mr. Justice Larson, speaking for the
court, invalidated t~he proceedings in the following
language:
":A·s to the errors in. description of the prop·erty, they are even more serious and more evident.
When real property is assessed or sold for taxes,
the des·c.ription must be such that the property
;can be definitely ktro:wn and located. The tax
becomes a lien on the property, and the de-s-cription must be definite enough for the lien to atta·ch
to the property without extra.neous evidence. If
there is no lien, there ·can be no sale. It must be
definite enough so the .o:wner will know just what
property is being sold, and a. pt·ospective pur·chaser will know what particular property he
.could ibuy, so as to determine i·ts value. By all
these tests this assessment and ta.x sale must fail.
No township, range, or section is given in whi~h
the property is lo:ca.ted, though the same appeared
of re·c·ord.
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"The statute requires tha,t, where land has
been sectionalized by the g·overnment, the section
or fractional se-rtion: must be given a.nd all parcels and subdivisions. The assessments here
involved simply loeat.e the property in the Tintie
Mining District, Jot No. 3615. N1nthin·g to s:how
the townhip in whi~ch the lot is loca.ted, or whether
or not it is a rity lot, pla.tted as such, .and ini what
city. No lien could attach by virtue thereof
because no ·one could knio"r the land to which it
attached. ' '
Th·en, too, the uncontradicted evidence showed that
plaintiff did not pay the purported ass·essments for the
years 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932 and 19·33, but on the othe~
hand permitted ;the property, whatever it was, to go 'bo
tax deed. In 193£ plaintiff paid Salt Lake C:ounty the
sum ·Of $143.;25 and thereafter received a deed quitclaiming Salt Lake 'County's right, title, an·d interest in
and to ''R. E. and Imps. on 'Cla.ys Placer, Cupperton,
Bingham Canyon below ·town". This is undoubtedly the
oooo.si•on when someone went back and changed the
assessment records for

th~e

years 1929 and 19•30 to insert

the words "Real Estate'' and '·'R. E ..and''' in red ink
in front of the word ''Improvements''.

B·e that as it

may, such purported purchase of an indefinite and uncertain portion of the Clays Placer Claim would neither ·be
sufficient as a ·eonveyan~ce or as a des-cription for the
payment of taxes.

In fact the pur-chase of property at tax sales does
not constitute the payment of taxes at all. When property
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is sold for taxes the property itself pays the taxes and
the pur-chaser buys the property.
Ho;ns on v. B ur·ris, 86 Utah 424;
Wilson v. Salt Lake County, 57 Utah 274.

2 C. J. 208, ;Section 432, Adverse Possession:
''"P·ermitting the land to be sold for taxes and
buying it in is not a payment of taxes within the
meaning of any of these statutes.''
'There is yet another obje-ction to the purported payment ·Of taxes by plaintiff. Section 80-5-12 provides that
~the pr1operty shall be ass-essed in the name of the re-cord
owner, and under Se.ction 80-5-18 if the property is
claimed by more than one person tha.t the claimant may
h1ave his name inserted with that of the person to him
the land is assessed. Since plaintiff was not the record
owner of the property any assessment in his name was
not in .conformity with the statute, even if it had been
made by the legally constituted taxing authority 1and
could not ,constitute complianc.e 'vith the statutory provisions that he must have paid ail taxes assessed a,ccording to law.
Here again we not only have the provisi:ons of
~Section 80-5-12 making it mandatory to assess property
in the name of the record owner, but we have in addition
decisions by this court invalidating assessments in the
name of one who is not the owner.

Salt Lake Investment C·o. v. 0. S. L.
road, 46 Utah 203;
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Tintic Un-dine Min.in.g Co. v. Eroanbrack,
93 Utah 561.
·T,he purported assessment in the case a.t bar by the
county assessor in the name of a person not the owner
of record and eovering· a very uncertain and indefinite
portion of the Cl~ays Placer seems to fit very perfe.c:tly
into the lang11ag·e used by Mr. Justice Larsen in the
Tinti~ Undine Mining Company case, supra, wherein he
said:
''Such a jumble of wrong names ·could easily mislead and is clearly not a -compli,ance with the
statute under many decisions of this eourt. The
records are at the courthouse and the assessor
must not be permitted to deprive an owner o.f
his property by neglect and palpable inaccuracies
in his official work.''
We might add to this comment by Mr. Justice Larsen
by statin-g that in addition to the jumble of wrong names
and uncertain descriptions that the jumble was further
·muddled in this case by having the assessment made by
an illegal taxing agen~cy.
To summarize: the purported levy of taxes, upon the
basis of which pl~aintiff attempts to assert adverse possession, were illegal in aibont every fundamental and necessary particular. They were assessed by the wrong taxing
agency In the 'vrong name, and purported to cover an
uncertain and indefinite piece of real or personal
property.
Since, therefore, plaintiff f·ailed to prove the paymen-t iof taxes assessed acc-ording to law during the seven
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ye~ar

period immediately preceding the commencement
of the action, he .comes directly u~der the condemnation
.of numerous ptah eases holding that failure to prove
payment of taxes lawfully asse'3sed and levied defeats
any a~c.tion for ~adverse possession. A most recent de·cision
upon this point is Peterson v. Johnson,, 84 Utah 89.
·The langua,ge of the statute, however, Section
104-2-12 is c-onclusive upon the subject that in no case
shall adverse possession be ·considered established under
the provisions of any section of the -code unless it shall
he shown that the party claiming adverse possession has
paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon
such land according to law.
This. failure on the part ·OI the p1aintiff to prove
payment of taxes by ihimself is sufficient to sustain the
judgment of the trial.court in dismissing the action with
prejudiee. It was not necessary for defendants to prove
that

the~

themselves paid taxes upon the property in

question. D·efendants produced their evidence however,
to the effect that. during this ·entire period of time,
namely, during the seven years immediately preceding
institution of the suit, the State Tax Commissio1;1
had levied taxes. upon the Clays Placer Mining ·Claim,
and the whole thereof, and tha.t defendants had paid
those taxes.

:This probably was not

necess~ary.

on the

part of defendants sinee plaintiff had not bas-ed his case
upon the theory that no taxes had been levied or paid
upon the· surface rights, but on the

con~rary

alleged that
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taxes had been lawfully assess.ed and that. he had p-aid
them.
·The trial colrrt found that the ·Tax Commission had
levied a full tax on both the surface a.nd sub-surface, and
we submit that tl1e eourt "Tas right in so finding.
While defendants paid taxes for upwards of twenty
years on the entire mining clraim, it is neeessa.ry to consider only the taxes levied by the Tax C!ommission sin,c:e
its creation, as that period covers the .seven statutory
years.
·The Tax Commission was created in 19'31. It was
stipulated ('Tr. 103-104) tha.t the traxes paid by defendants were levied by the State ·Tax Commission. The
property was

des.cribe~d

as ''()lays Placer Lot 118, West

Mountain Mining District'' and the valuation placed
under the heading '''Real Estate", and the amount p·atid
was1. designated'' general tax.''
Seetion 80-3-1, subse·ction 2, states that the words
'''real estate'-, when used in title 80, relating to revenue
and taxation, in·cludes :
'' (a) The possession of, elaim to ownership
of or right to the possession of, 1and.
(b) All mines, miner!als, and quarries in and
under the land, all timber belonging to individuals
or corporations growing or being on the lands of
this state or the Unite~d S1tates-, and all rights and
privileges appertaining thereto.
(e) Improve1nents. ''
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This, therefore, is a comprehe·nsive term and includes
not only the surf!ace but all mines, minerals and quarries
under the land and all improvements on thje land. A
general assessment, therefore, under this heading ''Reral
E.state'' includes both the surface and sub--surface, and
by the statute expressly inrludes the mines, minerals and
quarries and the surface. But, says plaintiff, all mineral
ground must be assessed twice: first the s~rface, and
second sub-surface. Not S·O. There is no such provision
in the law. Mineral 1and is no different from any other
land. It is all supposed to be taxed upon the basis of its
full value. For mineral land, however, there is a differe'nt method provided in the statute for arriving at the
full value.
1Section 80-5-46 prescribes the gener•al
duties of the State

T~ax

p~owers

and

Commission, one of which powers

and duties under sub-section 6 is to assess all real, personal, and mixed property which the Tax Commission is
iby the ·Constitution and laws .o.f the State required to
assess. Section 11 of Article XIII .creates the State 'T,ax
Commission and p;rovides that it shall assess mines.
Section 80-5-55 provides that the State Tax Commission
must prepare each year a book called "'The Assessment
B·ook .of Mines," in which must he entered the assessment of all mines in the State, and Section 80-5-56 prov!·des that all metaliferous mines and mining elaims, both
placer 'and rock in place, shall he assessed a:t $5.00 per
aere, and in addition thereto at a value ·equal to three
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times the net annual proceeds thereof.
oontains the f.ollo"""ing- language:

This section

''In all-cases "'"here the surface of lands is owned
by one person and the mineral underlying such
lands is owned by another, such property rights
shall be separately assessed to the respective
owners.''
·
Thus it "\Yill be seen that the only authority given to
the 'Tax Commission, and the .only duty placed upon the
State Tax Commission to make a segregated assessment
of the surface and mineral rights is where the surface is
owned by one person and the mineral underlying the
surfa,ce is owned by another. ·Otherwise in the ahsen:ce
of such a segregation a general assessment under the
heading ''Real Est!ate" by the Tax Commission is expressly, by the pr.ovisions of S~ection 80-3-1, comp.rehen·Sive as including both the surface and mineral rights.
This provision is simply an additional precaution
which the legislature has taken ·in the case of mining
property to see that mining claims 'are taxed to their
full value. l\fining pr·operty lends itself to an easy and
advantageous segregation of the mineral rights from the
surface rights. This segregation is accomplished by the
owner of the property when he conveys with a reservation of miner~al rights or when ,he .conveys the mineral
rights separate and apart from the surface. In the
absence .of such segregation, however, a general asses·sment of the mining claim under the he,ading ''Real
Estate' ' ,comprehends the entire estate.

The Tax Con1-
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mission ha.s the power to make this general assessment,
and this is exactly wha.t was done in the .case at bar.
If plaintiff's theory were ·corre·ct, which it is not,
the ·State Tax ,C'ommission could make no general asses·sment upon mining .claims, notwithstanding the exp;res·s
provision of ·our statute givin.g it authority S·O to do.
The law likewise requires, not only as to mining property
but a.s to all property, that impr·ovements on real ·estate
shall ihe assessed in ~ddition to the value .of the real property. This does not -create separ.ate, distinct a.nd indep·endent titles. If an ·asses·sment were levied upon Lot
5, 'Blo·ek 2, Salt Lake City Survey, lmder the heading
•·'Rea.] Estate", .could it be -eontended, in view of .S,ection
80-3-1, which expressly provides that improvements are
comprehended within the provisi.ons ''real estate',. that
no .taxes were levied upon the improvements' Certainly
not. ·The 'Tax ·C!olllliilission or the assessor, as th:e ease
migiht be, might be guilty of disregarding the provision
of the statute which pr·ovide'S that impr.ovements sha.ll
be ·Separately stated, but ·certainly no one ,could contend
th~at such an assessment was not a general assessment
and comprehended the improvements in view of Section
80-3-1. Improv·ements a.re attached to the real property
.and are a part of it. So· is the surface of a mining claim,

rand so are the miner!als. Certainly the legislature had
some purpose . in. mind w;hen it proVided that for the
purpose of. ta.xation an assessment under the heading
'' real·estate '' in-cludes the pos·s·ession of, clajm to, ownership of,

~or

right to the p·ossession ofl lands and all mines,
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minerals and qu:arries in or under them, and all rights
and privileg·es appertaining thereto, together with improvements thereon. And certainly this court in the
Eckman ease hereinafter referred to \vas not engaging
in idle chatter \vhen it referred to an assessment for
''all ~purposes'' as embflacing surface and sub-surfa,ce
rights.
But, says plaintiff, there has been a segregation of
the surface and mineral rights in this .case. We naturally
answer that question by asking when .and by wh,om ~
Certainly the legal owner of the property made no such
segregation, and a stranger to the title can make no
such segregation e~cepting by adverse p·oS"session, and
adverse possession is not accomplished e:x:cepting by full
compliance with the statute. One of the re·quisites of
the statute is that the adverse claimant pay all taxe·s
levied .acoording to law. During ·the years preceding
19·29 there certainly was no p·ayment of taxes by plaintiff because -among other~ reasons, the purported levy
was by the county assessor, whereas it shoul·d have
been by the State Board of Equalization. (Laws of
Utah 1919, ·Chapter 114). Up to that time the assessment admittedly ~covered only imp~rovements on Clays
Placer. During the years 19'29, 1930, 1931, 1932 and
1933 there was no payment of taxes at all by anyone except defendants, plaintiff failing to pay even
the illegally levied taxes assessed by the county assessor. It is difficult, therefore, to see how plaintiff
can contend that there ever was :a segregation by anyone.
Certainly in the absence of payment of taxes there never
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could have been any segregation until adverse possess'ion
was .complete through the payment of taxes.
P1aintiff implie-s, however, that if his payment was
illegal, the defendants' payment was inadequate because,
as he contends, it .c.overed only the mineral rights, hence
no taxes were levied upon the .surface and he is nevertheless entitled to a de-cree for adverse p·ossession. There
are two things wrong with that proposition: First, there
is no foundation in plaintiff's ·complaint for any such
theory nr any such alleged cause of action. His complaint does not allege that no taxes were levied but on
the .contrary alleges that taxes were lawfully levied a:nd
that he- paid them. The court has definitely and correc:tly answered this in the negative. Second, the State
Tax Commission, as we have heretofore ·shown, levied
a full .and complete tax .on the mining claims, both' surface- and sub-surfa1ce, which was paid by defendants.
Pilaintiff attempts to make argument to the effect
that the assessment by the State Tax ·Ciommission wa,s
partial ·and covered only the mineral rights, out of the
fa-ct that the assessment was based upon valuation of
$5.00 per a-cre. We answer that by stating that as to
the owner of the elaim whoi had made no segregation of
the mineral and surfa:ce rights, that was all there was
to do and it amounted to a full .and complete assessment.
Plaintiff, as .a squatter or trespasser upon the ground,
or as the -claimant of some improvements thereon, may
have been obligated to: pay taxes upon the value of his
p·ersonal property or

im~provements,

and apparently this
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is exa,ctly "·hat the ·County assessor plaeed upon the tax
rec-ords and "·hat plaintiff was p.aying.
When" a person for his o"''ll convenience and at his
own expense ·constr.ucts a building upon the land of
another the building re1nains personal property and
belongs to the one \Yho constructs it.
Da.tne v. Da·me,
38 N. H. 429·, 75 Am. Dec. 19,5;
Work1nan v. Henrie,
71 Utah 400, 266 ·Pac. 1033, 58 A. L·. R.
1346.

The law expressly recognizes the possibility of such
improvements being owned b~ a person other than th'e
owner of the realty, and provides for the assessment
there·of not again.st the owner of the rea:lty but against
the owner of the improvements as personalty.
Our statute, 80~3-1, sub-section 3, states that the
word ''improvements'' includes building, structures,
fixtures, fences and improvements upon or affixed to the
land, whether tlhe title ha.s been acquired t·o the la;nd or
not, thus recognizing the ·p·ossibility that the land may
he assessed in the name of one individual and improvements in the name of another, dependent upon the
·circumstances of the particular case.

2 ·Cooley on Taxation 1219, ·se-ction 559, is as follows:·
''H1owever, if buildings or other impr10vements are
erected on exe.mpt land or on land owned by
another person they a.re taxable separately t1o
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t1heir qwner, provided they are not fixtures, unless
otherwise provided by statute, either as real or
personal prop-erty aecording to circumstan-ces.''
T~·ere

is nothing unusual about this situation. If the
plaintiff ·owned any improvements whi·ch had been placed
upon the lands and .p·remises of defendants, either with
or wit·hout their consent, th,ey were taxable in the name
of plaintiff. This has nothing to do with a general- tax
upon the rea1ty which -comprehended both the surface
and mineral rights under the ~heading ''real estate,''
which by the s.ame ·statute is made all comprehensive.
As before stated, howeve:r, the .a.s,sessment made
against defendants and. the /tax paid by defendants
covered the entire Clays Placer Mining -claim and was
levied by the le·gally .constituted taxing authority, and
there never was any s-egregation of the mineral rigihts
from the surfaee ground either made by them or permitted to be made by them so as to warrant or authorize
any additional assessment u·nder the provisions of S.ection 80-5-'5·6.
The inconsistency of- plaintiff's position is very
evident. This is mining property-alleged and admitted
by both parties. The Tax c·ommission is to assess
mining property. Plaintiff alleges and now contends
that an illegal assessment by the -county assessor of
''Improvements on Clays Placer'' and ''Re. and Imp.
on Clays Placer'' in plaintiff's name covers the surface
only, but that a legal assessment of ''Clays Placer Mining Claim'' under the heading ''~R-eal· Estate'' in the
names of defendants does not cover the surface. Con-
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sistency thou art a jewel! Having thus alleged and
no"\v insisting that such a general description covers
the surface fQr his ~own benefit he denies that ·the same
rule of la'v applies to defendants. Plaintiff cannot
take one view of the law for his own benefit and an
opposite one as to _d.efendants. Of course, the obvious
answer is that such a general description 0overs the
surface in both instances, but the difference is that one
is a -Ieg·al assessment and the other illegal.
Plaintiff seems to feel, however, that the cases of
Utah Copper Compa;ny v. Charndler, 45 Utah 85, and
Utwh ·Copper Compain)ry v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, are a.
complete answer to all of this argument, and states that
they are on all f.ours with the cas.e at har and .are against
our contentions.
A more careful reading and understanding of thog,e
cases demonstrates the error into which counsel has
fallen.
·There are two things which .absolutely distinguish
the .Chandler ·case from the case at bar, first the fa,cts,
ana second, the law. That case was tried up·on an agreed
statement of facts, namely, that the taxes levied and
aesessed against the Copp·er Company as owner of the
mining .claim was at the ra.te of $5.00 p·er acre but tha·t
''there was no assessment or taxation against the plaintiff (Copper ·Company) on the lots or the improvements
thereof; also that the defendants (~Chandler) and their
grantees paid all the taxes a·ssessed on the lots .and
premises in question. Also it \\ras agreed that sueh
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assessment aga.int the Copper Ciompa:ny and c:handler
'''shall in no manner be regarded as double as·sessments,
but, .on the -contrary, each assessment shall be in itself
a separate and distinct assessment, cumulative rather
than double". The only que-stion raised in the case as
to le-gality of either assessment was upon the ground of
uneertain ty.
The assessments in that case were under Section
2504 of the Revis·ed Statutes of 1'898, wihich provided
that all mines and mining claims shall be taxed at the
price paid the United States therefor, unless the surface
ground or s-ome .part thereof is used for other than mining purposes, in which case the surfa·ce ground shall be
taxed at its· value for sueh: other purpose.
Since decision in the Chandler case, however, the
last provision has been changed by adding the following:
''In all cases where the surface of lands is
owned hy ·One person and the mineral underlying
such lands is owned hy another, such property
rig1htS' shall ;be separately assessed to the respective owners.'' (Sec. 80-5-56 R. S. U. 1933).
·Of course when the Copper C'o;mpany .stipulated that
it had paid no such tax upon the surface, but that on the
other hand Chandler had paid taxes legally assessed
.against the surface, and further stipulated that such
taxes were .cumulative, not double, they in effect stipula,ted thems·elves ·Out of court. As before stated, the
only .a tt'ack which they made upon the Chandler assessment was upon the groun·d of uncertainty. Of ~eourse
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courts decide cases upon th·e facts presented to them.
The rase at bar is distinctly different, namely, plaintiff
has paid no taxes legally assessed .and, on the other hand,
defendants have paid full and complete assessment upon
the entire mining· claim, as found by the trial court and
.as establiS'hed by th·e facts. Nor has the Strate of Utah
been deprived of any taxation during this period of time
because the surface improvements·, constituting all that
plaintiff owned or ever .claimed to own, were assess·ed~
to him and paid by him. It is apparent that in the
·Chandler case there was also a. claim ·Of right to the
surfa·ce on behalf of Chandler, .sin'Ce the ·C.opper ·C·om.pany wholly failed to rais-e that question. 'This was
equivalent to conceding in that cas·e that there had in
fact been a segregation through the facts warranting the
claim of title by Chandler.
The Chandler ease was very quickly followed by the
E:ckman case.

The surface of the Mirror Lode Mining

Claim ha·d for many years been platted into town lots,
and E·ckman had been in actual possession under claim
of right and had paid taxes thereon .and had a.lsro: paid

taxes . upon the improvements.

The Copper Company

on the other hand had paid taxes· only upon the mining
.claims.

Whether sueh: assessment to the ·Copper ·Com-

pany was full and complete assessment was not made
to appear in the .case.

A decree in favor of Eckman

was rever·sed and remande·d for the reason that it did
not a p.pear that in assessing the mining claim to the
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Copper c:ompany, who held the legal title thereof, it was
not assessed to it for .all purposes~
Here, again, it will be observed that the facts are
entirely different from the ·case at har, becaus-e in that
ca·se the ground had been platted and it was undisputed
that Eckman traeed his title back and established a claim
of title such as satisfied the statute in that re.garod, and
i'n addition ~showed that he had paid taxes assessed
and levied al(~cording to law, the legality of which was
not a,ttacked. This is a decidedly different proposition
from the case at bar. Also, of course, in the Eckman
~case, as in the Chandler ease, the statute with reference
to the asHessment and taxation of surface rights was
different from- our law, since the creation of the State
Tax Commission, in that the old law made no reference
whatsoever to segregated ownership, whereas the present
law takes cognizan·ce of segregation by requiring a
limited assessment against the legal owner, and a surface
assessment against the adverse :claimant, or an assessment in the names of hoth parties where there has been
either a ·Segregation or where there is an adverse cl'aim
asserted.
These provisions of the law with reference to limited
assessments in the case of segregation or the inS'ertion
of both names in the ·event of an adverse or additional
-claimant are for the very purpose of info:rm5-ng the
owner of the legal title of the facts as shown by the tax
rec:ords. Otherwise a person .paying his as.sessm·ent upon
a mining· clamn may be lulled into a sense of security,
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believing that he has paid all the· taxes assessed against
the mining ~laim, wh·en in fact S'ome squatter or trespasser may have created an additional liability .for taxes'.
Thus we see that neither the Chandler -ease nor the
Eckman case can giYe any ·comfort or assistance to the
plaintiff. T:hose rases ''Tere both decided upon the facts
presented, and the la.w as it then stood and the court
decided the issues inv-olved in those ·ca,S'es.
A so:mewhat similar question was raised in the case
of Rarn.ard Re~alty Co. v. City of Butte, 145 Pac. 9·46.
The B~arna.rd Placer Mining Claim was situated within
the ·corporate limits of the City of Butte. The owners
·caus-ed a portion of the surface of the ,claim to be subdivided into lots and blocks and made an addition to the
city. The remaining and unplatted area was assessed
originally as placer mining property at· $2.50 per
acre, but subsequently the assessor, at the instance
of the city authorities, again assessed the area in
controversy at a valuati~on of $19,000.00 upon the theory
that it had an independent value as city lots. When
the treasurer proceeded to advertise and sell th·e
property as delinquent, the action was brought to obtain
a decree de-claring the assessment null and void. The
·Constitution of .Montana was the same as the C'onstitution of Utah before the amendment, and provided that

mining property should be taxed at the price paid the
United States therefor unless the surface ground is used
for other than mining purposes and has a separate
and independent value for such other purposes, in which
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.case the surface ground shall be taxed a.t its value for
such other purpose. The Supreme C:ourt of Montana
invalidated the as-sessment and us·ed the following language as to the meaning of this particular language and
its applicability to the owner of a mining claim:
''Recognizing the faet that such propery is not
generally susceptible of profitable US'e unless the
deposits therein are extracted and put into commercial f~orm, and in order to ·encourage the work
of .profitable development by prote-cting it against
exactions whieh: might prevent this result, it was
deemed that .the owner of a mining claim would
fully acquit himself of his obligation to the public
by :Raying a tax: (1) Upon the a1crea.ge at the
price paid to the United States; (2) upon the
machinery used in mining and ·surface improve.ments, etc., upon or appurtenant to the claim,
whieh have a. value independent thereof; and (3)
upon the net proceeds of the product. So long as
the .claim is used and held ex.clusively for mining
purposes, the owner of i,t is not required to bear
any ·other burden; but when the property, having
by its loea.tion acquired a value for some independent use, is .dev-oted by the ow'ner to such use,
it becomes a.t once subject to: taxation at that
value as is· other real estate, to be ascertained
by the ass-essing .offieer just as he as:certains the
value of -other land for the purpose of taxation.
By devoting it to the new use, the ow'ner, so to
speak, :creates an estate which, in the eye of the
law, is regarded as independent of the original
estate and is subject to taxation as such. It will
be noted, however, that two 1eonditions must concur to' justify the imposition ·of the additional
burden; viz., the surface ground, or some part
thereof, must be used for other than mining purposes, and it must have an independent value for
1
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that purpose. When these ~conditions -concur, but
not other\Yise, the owner mu.st assume the additi07l.al b 1t·r den. ' '
.A.s before stated, the original statute ''rith reference
to taxation of mines (La\YS .of Utah 1919, Cha1p~ter 114,
Section 5864), and also Section 2504 of the Revised
Statutes of 1898 under whi~h both the ·Chandler and
Eckman cases \Yere decided, simply provided that mines
should be taxed at the price paid the United States therefor unless the surface ground is used for other than
mining purp.oses and has a separate and independent
value for ·such other purpos·e, in which case the surface
ground shall be taxed at its value for sueh other purpose. Those provisions were repealed when the Tax
Commission \Yas created in 1931, and instead thereof
Section 804j-56 was enacted. Instead of the general
provision contained in the prior enactments the legiS'lature changed the wording to read as follows:
''In .all cases where the surface of land is owned
by one person and the mineral underlying such
lands is owned by another, such property rights
shall be separately assessed to the respective
owners.''
The effect of this was to require separate assessment of the minerai rights from the surface only where
there ;has been a severance either created or permitted
lby the owner; otherwise the other p-rovisions of the
statute control which call for a general as·sessment in
the name of the owner. Our present statute is similar
in effect to one enacted by the State of Kansas which
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provided that -where the fee to the surfa.oe was 1n any
person or persons and the right to the minerals therein
'
in another, there should be a. separate assessment and
taxation of thos·e interests. The State of Kansas sought
to tax a leas·ehold interest in mineral lands: as a separ.ate
entity .from the real estate which had been taxed in the
name of the ·owner of the realty. The .Supreme C:ourt
of K·ansas d·enied the right of the taxing a.uthoritie·s to
thus tax the mineral estate as a separate entity in the
absence .of severance, and -construed the general meaning
of th·e statute in the ·ca:se of Ka~nsas Na:tura:l Gas Comp~any v. Boa~rd of CO'nvmission.ers, 89 Pac. 750, in the
following language :
'' '·Land,' .of ;course, is an all-comptehensive
term, and includes ·everything the elementary law
books .say it includes. It may be .composed in part
of minerals, using the term 'minerals' .in the
popular sense of those inorganic constituents of
the earth's crust which are commonly obtained
by mining, or other- process for bringing th·em to
the surface, for profit. The mineral and nonmineral portions of land are distinguis1hable and
severable both in legal theo:ry and in .fact, and
se!parate property rights in each may coexist.
Minerals in place are a part of the land i tsel.f, and,
while they are unsevered, are treated as real
estate. * * * ·On the other hand, the act as
clea.rly deals with sev·ered titles. * * *
"It is contemplated that there :shall be an
·estate consisting of what is left after th-e mineral
rights have been 1carv.ed out, and that there shall
be an estate ·consisting of the mineral rights which
have been segregated. The sta!tute further c.ontemplat·es that ·each .estate mu,st vest in a sep:a.rate
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person.. The respective proprietors are called
'·owners', and tilie estate in the minera:ls is nothing
short of the right or title to the minerals themselve-s as they lie in th-e ground. When such a
state ·Of affairs exists, the statute regards the
O"\rner of the minerai rights as the proprietor of a
distinct item of property which is taxable to him,
apart from that which is taxa1ble to the owner of
the tract, parcel, or lot in which the minerals are
located, and it makes provision for separate lists,
·entries, des-criptions, valuations, etc. The right
or title to the minerals, as the statute exp·resses
it, is taxed as realty. The owner :is charged with
taxes aeeording to the value of his interest, and
t!!·e owner of the .overlying strata is tax·ed aceording to the value of the rem,aining intere·st in the
land. But there rnust be a severance of the right
to the mineral a.nd nontmineral portions of the
lan.d, ·respectively, before there cam. be a division
in taxation. Minerals in place bein.g real est·a,te,
the act assumes t.ha.t instruments creating separate interests 1Jn them ~vill be pla.ced of record,
but it provides that, if such instruments are not
recorded within 90 days .after execution, they shall
become void unless they are brought to the attention of the tax officials, s·o that the purpose of the
first part of the section may be aecomplish·ed. As
before noted, the open~ng sentences of the body
of the ,act tell just w·hal it proposes to tax, a;nd
how that subject of taxation shall be liste~d and
valued and taxed.

"* * * Until di1seovered and brought to
the surfa-ce, no severance of title occurs. The
minerals not only remain a. constituent part of
the land, but they belong to the owner of the surface soil beneath which they lie.'' (Italics ours).
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Tihis decision was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court
.of Kansas in the case of Luman v. Davis, 19·6 P~ac. 107'8,
in the following language:

''When such severarn1ce occurs, the minerals are
separately listed, valued, and taxed as real
estate." (Italics ours).
A s-omewhat similar situation was presented to the
Supreme ~Court of ·Colorado in the cas-e of Kansas City
Life lrnJSuravnce Co. ·v. P·rowers CoU!Ylty Oil & Gas Comp·any, 254 Pac. 438. In that case .a land company had made
a. severance by ·conveying to an ·oil company the mineral.s
under the surface and thereafter horrowed from the insurance company, and mortgaged the land as security,
with ,the usual .eovenants .for the payment of ta.x·es. The
oil company als·o gave a mortgage to the insurance 0ompany of the mineral ri~ht.s as additional security for the
land ·company mortgage. Up.on default the insurance
company purchased the interest of the land ;company,
suhject, how·ever, to certain taxes for the years 19 22 and
1923 which the insurance company paid. Thereafter the
insurance company brought ·suit a.ga.inS't the oil company
for the deficiency, and the oil ·company sought to have
the amount of the taxes disallowed upon the .theory that
the general tax upon the land covered only the surface
right's, and by reason thereof was not chargeable agains)t
the oil company as holder of the mineral rights. ~he
1

Supreme Court of C'olorado in construing such a

ge~

eral asses·sment on the land as a whole even in the presence ·Of segregation used the .following language:
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''It n1ay not be easy to determine the exact
amount, be•eause the taxes '"ere assessed on the
land as a whole, ''"'ith no segTegation of the several rights of the land co mpany and the oil company, but it cannot be impossible, sin·ce the segref?:ation h'fls recently been made by the as!sessor.
'·'The claim of the defendants in error that
the taxes in question '"ere asses.sed and levied on
the interest of the land company only will not
stand. It is undisputed that there w'a·s one levy
£n the ordinary ~V'ay, a.s u.p-ovn other land, and
that the ·insurance comparn-y pa.id the 1vhole tax.
There -can be no question, then, that the levy
covered the interest of both the comp~anies defendant, nor that the insurance company has paid
the oil company's taxes.'' (Italics ours).
1

Certainly if that were true in the presence of segregation i·t is doubly true in the r;ase at bar where there i·s
no evidence of segregation, and where it is uncontradi~cted that defendants have paid a general asse·ssment
upon their lands ·and premisesi as HsseS'sed hy the legally
constituted taxing auth.orities.
The State of Indiana has a statute similar in effeet
to our Section 80-5-56. which requires segregated assessment in all cases where the surface of lands is ·owned by
one p·erson and the mineral underlying is owned fby
anoth~r. ·On March 1, 1919· certain mineral lands by
gene:oal assessment were a~ssessed for taxation. Thereafter the O\Yner sold the mineral rights in the property.
A~er seve:vance the mineral rights were ·separately
a8sessed to the purchaser, but no deduction was made
for .a commensurate am1ount from the a:s~sessed valuation
of the owner. The ·Owner contended that the mineral
;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
rights w:ere compreh'ended within the general assessment, ~and that upon segregation the value of the mineral
rights should be deducted. ·On the other hand, the taxing aulthoiities contended that in ass·esisin.g 'the land
prior to segregation the minerals were not taken into
·con:sideration and were not comprehended within the
general assessment. :Thi.s ·case was -considered by the
appellate eourt ·Of Indiana in the case of Board of C.omm.issioners of Vigo Cownty v. Hale, 15:6 N. E. 172. In
sustaining the co~ntention of the 1_andowner ~hat he was
entitled to 1a deduction after ·segreg,ation, the court said:
"·However, it is only where~ there is ~s-eparate
ownership of the minin.g right"B thwt the law re·quires a S'eparate assessment o\ such rights.''
So in the case at har, 11nder our ~neral tax law
.separate a·s.sessments are made only after segregation,
and after segregation each party is assessed with the
value of ·only thmt which he owns. Regardless ·of what
th·e law may have heen under the old statu\e·s in force
.when the ~Chandler and ;E,ckman cases we~-. d~cided,
.such certainly is the law of thi·s State ·since fn.e enactment of Section 80-5-5·6 in 19'31, whi~ch, after a1~ is the
period ·of time in queSition in this case.
While the owner may thus create a.n addin. onal
·estate in minerall~ands, it certainly was never the in~en
tion of the legi·slature .that a trespasser or squatter eo11d
create a ~s-e-grega.tion by causing an illegal ass·essment t1
be made by an illegal taxing authority when at the same
tim.e the legally -constituted taxing authorities are asse·ss-
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ing- the full mining claim to the legal owner, and the
legal O"\Yner is paying a full tax.
Previous to 1the year 1884 the payment of ta.xe·s was
not an essential element to the acquisition of title by
adverse possession in the 'State· ·of Utah. Prior to that
time adverse ·possession could mature without the legal
owner having any :actual kn·owledge there-of and. during
the period o.f time "\Yhen he was fully ·complying with his
.civic duty with reference to the payment of taxes. The
injustice ·Of this situa.t1on with reference ~to mining claims
became immediately apparent because mining property
is usually located in inaccessible country .and very often
held as a part of the mineral reserves ·of the state and
nation for future development by p-eople residing -else~here and wh9. may have no occasion ~to actu,ally visit
the premises. r Als-o in mining country it is well known
that for pu:r:pose:s -of occupancy people place a ~shack
whe-re it best suits their purposes, "\vithout regard to
boundaries. Many 'conflicts occur. Squatters a.nd trespas.sers use what they find handy for their purposes, and
the real ?""ners very often have no knowledge of what
is ·occuring. It was to me-et exactly this situation that
the legisJ.ature in 1884 passed t:he amendment making
the

p~yment

si~iD?

of taxes an essential element to 1the aequi-

of premi,ses by adverse possessilon.

Through thi·s

method the legal owner might know if he was not
p.ayin.g taxes and would be led to inquire the rea·son. It
was to further safeguard this situation that the legislature passed the further amendment in 1931 requiring
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segregated assessment ·Only in ca.ses of actual segregat~orn, and under the provi·sions of Section 80-5-18 any
pers.on ·claiming the sarrne :and desiring to ibe ass-ess·ed
therefor may have his name inserted with tha.t of the
legal owner. 'The.se safeguards were for the very purpose of informing the legal owner of the fact that he
was paying a diminished asse·ssment, segregated a:Ss·es~s
ment, or that some claimant was having his name placed
upon the tax rolls as a claimant f:olr the purpose of paying taxe~s. If .a mere trespas·ser may, by his surreptitious. act unknown to the owner ·Of a. legal estate, be permitted to :ereate .an illegal assessment, and then, by
paying the same, cause the statute ·Of limitations to run
and adverse possession to a,c;crue in a mining .claim, the
pu-rpose's tof thes-e very wise provisions of our taxing
statutes are entirely defe!ated.
Horizontal or .segregated assessments are not confined to mineral lands. It is not at all uneommon for
one person to own the fee ,of real property and another
to own the buildings. Very often agricultural lands are
found to contain minerai values. It certainly W·ould be
an an·omaly in the law if the discovery of oil or other
mineral could .have the effect ·Of creating a ·segregation
of titles ·so a·s to ·entirely invalidate a gener.al assessment upon the p·remises and make it possible fot a
squatter or tre.spas·ser to questi1on the !sufficiency ·or
validity of the .taxes that had been paid.
However, as before stated, it was not necessary for
the trial ·court to find that defendants had paid a. full
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tax upon the mining claims, nor is it necessary for thi'S
.court to pass upon that quest1on. Plaintiff had th·e
privileg·e before commencing' his suit to determine
whethe-r he 'vould proceed upon the theory that taxes
had been levied and that they had been paid by plaintiff,
or~ on the other hand, to take the other theory that no
taxes 'vha.tsoever had been levied upon the surface. In
the latter case it would :have been necessary for him to
prove that negative. He c.hose the form·er theory and
the cause of action alleged i.s to the effect that taxes
were lawfully levied, and that they weTe paid by the
plaintiff. It is too late now, upon a.pp.eal, to change
theories and by denying the allegation which ihe himself
made attempt to recover upon the basis that no taxes
were levied.
In the case -of Central Pac. Railw-ay Co. v .. Tarpey,
51 Utah 107, this eourt, speaking ,of the necessity of

proving the negative where it is ;claimed that no taxes
were lawfully levied, used the following language:
''If they were not levied and assessed the burden
wa·s on .him to show that fact.' If they were levied
and assessed the b·urden was on him to show
that he paid them. There is no -other eonclusi1on
possible under the ~statute as ·construed by the
authoritie.s. Flrom the foregoing it conclusively
appears appellant did not pay the taxe·s on the
land :although they were levied and a.s.ses~sed for
seven eonsecutive years after his claim :of adverse
pos~session began to run, hence he did not acquire
ti tie to the land as against the respondent, the
holder of the legal title.''
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It goe.s without saying that if they intend to prove
no taxes were levied there must be foundation in the
pleadings for that kind of a cause of action, not o:rie
bas.ed upon tJhe theory that ~taxes were lawfully levied.
It will he observed that ·even now, in plaintiff's brief
this cas-e, he a:ss·erts and re-:asserts that taxes were leviea
and that he paid them, which is destructive of his ~ther
contenti1nn that no taxes were la.wfully levie·d by the
Tax Commission against the .surfa;ce.

in

We .submit, therefore, that under this very fundamental and vi·tal proposition the judgment of the trial
.court .shoUld be ~sustained and affirmed, regardless .of
the views which the ·court may entertain with reference
to any other of the questi.tons pres-e~nted.
CLAIM OF TITLE AND HOSTILE POS·SESSION. (Assignments of Error 2 and 4).
The trial court found that the occupancy by plaintiff of a portion of the lands and premises inViolved in
the action was without title or claim of title, and also
found that such possession and occupancy had not been
hostile or adverse but, .on the other hand, had been in
subordination to the legal title of defendants.
Thes-e two assignments of error may very well be
considered together since they relate to the same general subject matter. Plaintiff argues that since his
evidence showed that he had been in ·Continuous possessi.on and occupancy of the property for more than
seven years, namely seventeen years, and that the prem-
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ises were enclosed by a fence, and that he had improved
the premises, that undeT the authorities t,his ·es~ablished
claim of title and hostile or adverse possession. He
cites as authority for this proposition Sections 187 and
189 of 1 .A.m. Juris. He also cites the case of Pillow v.
Roberts, 14 L. Ed. 228.
It is true that there are some authorities to the
effect that the phrases ''claim of right", ''claim of
title'' and ''claim of ownership'', when used in connection with adverse possession, mean nothing more than
intention of the disseizor to appropriate and use the
lands as his own. And it is also true that under some
cases such facts may be sufficient to raise a presu.mption
of adverse claim and 'IJ/Yiless rebutted may establish a
claim of right.
Our statute uses the phrase ·''claim of right" as a
necessary incident to adverse possession under either
written instrument in Section 104-2-8 or in S·ection
104-2-11 when adverse possession IS n.ot founded upon
a written instrument.
This court in the case of Rieske v. Hoover, 53 Utah
87, held that under the law of adverse possession it is
essential, in order that possession may be ·considered
as being adverse, that there should be an intention to
claim title.
There is, h·owever, a decided conflict of authority
as to the meaning of the phrase "·claim of title", when
used in connection with adverse possession. There are
authorities to the effect that "claim of title" is the equiv-
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alent of "color of title". The editor of American
Jurisprudence seems to have overlooked this line of
authorities in making that broad general statement. The
Supreme Court of Montana in a decision rendered October 6, 1937, in the case of Sullivan V'. N eel, 73 Pac. (2d)
206, in construing their statute, which requires ''claim
of title'' as a necessary incident to adverse possession,
used the following language:
"The phrase 'claim of title' as used in the foregoing section of the statute is synonymous with
that of 'eo lor of title.' ''
This court, while not expressly pass1ng upon the
question, has nevertheless in numerous cases recognized
the ·same principle as announced by the Supreme Court
of Montana by regarding the phrase "claim .of title"
as the equivalent of "color of title".
In the case of Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tarpey, 51
Utah 107, the court, in construing our statute as to the
sufficiency of a contract as a basis for ''claim of· title''
as a foundation for adverse possession, quoted with
approval the following:
'' 'An instrument, in order to operate as
color of title, must purport to convey title to the
clairnant thereunder, or to those 'vith whom he is
in privity, and n1ust describe and purport to convey the land in controversy.' 2 C. J. p. 174.
'' 'Color of title for the purpose of adverse
possessi,on under the statutes of limitation as to
land is that which has the semblance or appearance of title, legal or equitable, but 'vhich is in
fact no title.'' 1 Cyc. 1082.
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'' 'Color of title is 'that 'vhich in appearance
is title, but 'vhich in reality is not title'; that
'vhich seen1s and professes to convey the property described, but for some reason do-es not do
so.' Po"~ers Y. Kitching, note 88 Am. St. Rep.
~o·)

I

-·

\' \ ,,~henever an instrument by apt words of
conveyance from grantor to grantee in fq,rm
transfers what purports to be the title, it gives
color of title.' '' Powers v. Kitching, note 88
Am. St. Rep. 708 .
...:\Jso in that case it was held that open, notorious,
peaceable occupation even under claim .of right is not
sufficient.
..._-\.uthorities are legion to the effect that mere possession and occupancy, no matter how long continued,
without a claim of right will not establish a title by
adverse possession. Mosher v. Ari~ona Packing Company, 219 Pac. 232.
The doctrine of adverse possession 1s to be taken
strictly. Every presumption is in favor of a legal owner,
and our statute, Section 104-2-7, is as follows:
"In every action for the recovery of real
property, or the possession thereof,. the person
establishing a legal title to the property shall be
presumed to have been possessed thereof within
the time required by law; and the occupation of
the pr,operty by any other person shall be deemed
to have been under and in subordination to the
legal title, unless it appears that the property
has been held and possessed adversely to such
legal title for seven years before the commencement of the action."
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The case of 8heppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 131,
represents the vitality which this court recognizes as
existing in that provisi.on of our statute. In that case
the adverse claimant had not only made improvements
but had paid taxes and had had possession for over
twenty years, but the court permitted the real owner,
who had an equitable title only, to establish his legal
right to the property and disallowed the claim -of adverse
possession by the defendant, largely up-on the basis of
the presumption made mandatory by that provision of
our statute. This -court used the following language in
disallowing the claim of adverse possession in that case:
''Moreover, when, as in this ·case, the evidence justifies or requires a finding that when the
land was purchased the title thereto was vested
in the plaintiff, then, under our statute ( Comp.
.Laws 1907, section 2861), the presumption prevailed that the defendant's possession was 'in
subordination of the legal title.' This presumption continued until it was overcome by clear
proof that the defendant's possession was adverse
to such title. There is no evidence in this case
by which it is made to appear that the defendant
at any time repudia t.ed the title of the plaintiff
until he did so a short time before this action
w.as .commenced, and which re:pudiation in faJct
was the reason why the action was commenced.''
Even accepting as a correct pronouncement of the
law the quotation of Section 189 from 1 Am. Juris., page
897-8, it will be observed that the author states that
such occupancy and p~ossession raises a rebuttable presumption only. On · the other hand, as against that
presumption we have the express mandate of our statute
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that the presumption is in favor of the legal owner and
against the claimant.
Xow let us see \vhat the evidence showed in this
regard. In the first place there is no evidence that
either the plaintiff or any ~f his predecessors made any
claim of ownership to the property prior to the filing of
this suit in June 1937. The occupancy and the improvements seem to have been transferred from one to another
without any attempt to convey any interest in the land
so far as the evidence shows, and it is affirmatiYely
shown by plaintiff himself that when he went into occupancy in 1919 he and his predecessors transacted the
matter with the aid of an attorney, hut that no written
conveyance was executed, and there was no attempt to
convey any interest in the land. It is inconceivable that
these parties went to an attorney merely £or the purpose of having him witness the payment of some money.
Had the predecessor claimed title to the land, and had
the plaintiff thought that he was purchasing land when
they went to an attorney for the purpose of consummating the transaction it would have been natural that
the transa.ction should have ~been closed with the execution of some paper or conveyance. A natural inference
or presumption from this evidence upon the part of
plain tiff himself is that at that time there was ·no claim
of title in the real property up,on the part of anyone.
On the other hand there is also a fair inference to the
effect that at that time the predecessor was claiming only
the in1provements, and that plaintiff was purchasing only
the improvements. In this :connection the court will
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observe that to and including the year 19'28 the purported
taxes paid by plaintiff were described as £ollows: ''Improvements on ~Clays Placer''.
The same description was ,carried through 1929 and
1930, although someone subsequently changed it in red
ink to include the words '' R. E. and". Since the plaintiff did not pay those purported taxes in 1929 and 1930
but on the other hand permitted the property to g.o to
tax sale there was likewise a fair inference that this
red ink correction was made by son1e unidentified person
after the county had attempted to give a tax deed in
1936.
Be that as it may, there certainly was evidence
from which the trial court was justified, together with
the presumption required by Section 104-2-7 of our statute, in finding that during this entire period of time,
and particularly up to 1936, plaintiff was making no
claim of title to the real estate as such but was claiming
title only to the improvements upon which he was paying
the illegal taxes assessed by the county assessor.
The question as to, whether plaintiff had during the
period of time in question been occupying the premises
under "claim of title", and as to whether during that
period of time he was intending to occupy the premises
as his own, was a question of fact. If the extent and
·character of his :.nccupancy was ·suc:h as to raise a
presumption of hostility and claim of right, on the other
hand, the statute expressly gives a presumption the other
way, and it was for the trial court, which had the wit-
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nesse~

before it and listened to their story, to find that
fact, '\Yhich it did, against the plaintiff.
1-I~re,

again, up~on this issue, as upon the question of
sufficiency of payment of taxes by plaintiff, it is not
necessary for this court to pass upon this question in
order to sustain the judgment of the trial court in dismissing' the cause of action with prejudice because of
the fact that the uncontradicted evidence in the case
established that plaintiff had paid no taxes lawfully
assessed against the premises in question.

CONCLUSION.
The judgment of the trial court should he sustained
and affirmed for each and all of the following reasons:
1. Because plaintiff failed to prove that he had
paid all taxes levied and assessed against said premises
according to law, but on the' contrary affirmatively established by his own evidence that the purp,orted taxes
paid by him were not levied and assessed .according to
law, and did not cover the particular lands and premises
which he is now claiming, and were not assessed in the
name of the legal owner of said premises as required
by law.
2.

The uncontradicted ·evidence showed and estab-

lished that defendants, during the period of time in
question, paid taxes levied and assessed against said
premises according to law, and that said taxes paid by
defendants ·covered both the surface and

~sub-surface
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mineral rights. If this is not so then plaintiff failed to
allege and prove the negative.
~

3. That the occupancy by plaintiff of said lands
and premises was without claim of title and in subordination to the rights of possession of defendants.
Either one or all.o.f the foregoing propositions found
in favor of the .a:ction .of the trial eourt is sufficient to
sustain the decision and judgment dismissing plaintiff's
cause of action with prejudice.
We respeetfully submit the judgment of the trial
court should accordingly he affirmed.
RrcH, RicH &

STRONG,

Attorneys for Respondent'
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